

The Enlargement of the European Union Economic and institutional aspects

Seville, 28 and 29 October 2002

Who's Afraid of the Big Enlargement?

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and


Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti

Public Support to Enlargement

Spring 2002 Eurobarometer

- 50% of EU citizens in favour, 30% against
- 21% for unlimited support (*any* country in) and 21 against *any* enlargement
- 40% for limited enlargement
- 41% for QMV after enlargement, 33% for keeping unanimity

Percentage of Citizens _____ the EU Enlargement
(Spring 2002 Eurobarometer survey, valid votes only)



However


Citizens uninformed:

- many “don’t know”, only 21% feel well informed about Enlargement
- more than 50% does not know who will be the New Members
- when asked specifically majority against Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania and Turkey

Outline: WWW



- **Who's afraid of the Enlargement?**
- **Why are they afraid?**
- **What can be done to cope with these anxieties?**
 - Migration policies
 - Social policy reforms
 - Structural funds


WHO? Personal characteristics and attitudes towards EU enlargement



Le Pen voters have the same characteristics


La carte qui fait peur

-  Le Pen 1er
-  Le Pen 2ème




Les retombées radioactives de Tchernobyl

Activité surfacique de CESIUM 137 (en mai 1986)




Why Afraid?

Large income gaps *and* populations




better to wait for income convergence

Before joining the EU, the candidate country's economic development has to be close to the EU level: this condition is...



Source: Eurobarometer 56.3, 2002

but convergence is a long-term business (years required for convergence to low-income EU)




What to do?


- Make sure that perceived benefits of accession exceed perceived costs for *each* EU citizen
- This requires:
 - EU-wide *migration policies*
 - A well-functioning EU-wide safety net and *social protection* with mobility friendly institutions
 - reforms of *structural funds* and of their financing method (budget reform)

Migration Policies

Estimated migration *flows* to Germany




EU wide migration policies: more realistic and better enforced



Migrants grease the wheels of European labour markets


Germany: Regional Distribution of Employees from the CEECs

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


Source: Federal employment services, authors' calculations.

another example: Italian regions



but decisions of migrants should not be distorted by *safety nets*.....



skilled migrants go to country 1
unskilled migrants go to country 2

safety net in country 1:
also the unskilled go to country 1

OXFORD

Immigration Policy and the Welfare System

A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti
In Association with The William Davidson Institute

Edited by
**Tito Boeri,
Gordon Hanson, and
Barry McCormick**




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AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN


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Social protection via mobility friendly institutions: lessons from NAFTA




Moving along the UB/EPL tradeoff




Source of data: Oecd

Social dumping? No but we need better welfare systems in the East



Economic Convergence should be supported by *Structural Funds* as in previous Enlargements


ECUs per head



Possibly without increasing the EU budget


ITS JOINING THE EU SHOULD *NOT* BE COSTLY FOR EXISTING MEMBER COUNTRIES (country averages)

This condition is 1: Not at all important; 2: Not very important; 3: Fairly important; 4: Very important



Source: Eurobarometer 56.3, 2002

Still room to expand SF within the 1.27 EC budget/GDP cap



The “Enlargement tax”

- Inevitably net transfers to new countries will be positive. How large?
- Applying to new members the degree of redistribution implicit in the 1998 EU budget, the net transfer from *current* to *new* members is estimated in **52 euros per head** (totalling 19.5 billion euros, 0,25% of the EU GDP)
- this “tax” should be funded depending on income levels of current EU members (redistribute also via the financing mechanism)

Benchmark allocation of the budget costs of enlargement among the EU-15 and 1998 excess balances of these countries

	per capita costs		total cost	excess	difference
	in pps	in euros	in Meuros	deficit 1998	
Belgium	52.1	50.7	518	-609	1,127
Denmark	52.1	64.0	340	-994	1,334
Germany	52.1	55.4	4,545	3,529	1,016
Greece	52.1	40.9	431	-1,267	1,698
Spain	52.1	42.7	1,682	1,369	313
France	52.1	56.9	3,356	-4,160	7,516
Ireland	52.1	50.6	189	-2,066	2,255
Italy	52.1	47.0	2,705	2,239	466
Luxembourg	52.1	56.8	24	-221	245
Netherlands	52.1	51.2	807	1,254	-447
Austria	52.1	53.6	433	-289	722
Portugal	52.1	34.3	342	-567	909
Finland	52.1	57.3	296	178	118
Sweden	52.1	60.9	539	1,137	-598
UK	52.1	54.9	3,261	467	2,794
<i>EU-15</i>			<i>19,468</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>19,468</i>

Summarising

- EU-wide migration policies (including worksite inspections)
- Reforms of social policies encouraging protection in the market; gradual buildup of a pan-European safety net
- Reforms of structural funds increasing transparency in redistribution and effectiveness of regional policies

How to achieve all this?

- Conditionality related to entry is almost over
- Transitional period cannot be used to this end; nor it can buy time until convergence is achieved
- Incentives, reviews, suasion....
- ...and well-designed reforms