Monopsony, wages and working conditions
XXIV European Conference of the fRDB, Chioggia
Auditorium San Nicolò (Calle San Nicolò) and on-line on this page
12 September 2022
09:30 – 17:30
This year’s conference focuses on the presence of non-competition clauses in employment contracts and no-poaching, collusive agreements between companies, which limit workers mobility by giving employers monopsony power. Data on the presence of hiring concentration and no-poaching clauses in several OECD countries will be presented. It will be shown how hiring concentration goes hand in hand with lower wages. Monopsony power is in fact often used to lower wages below labour productivity and not to invest in improving working conditions.
The morning session begins with an opening lecture by Alan Manning (London School of Economics). The session focuses on the study “The Role of Non-Compete in Monopsony: The Case of Italy” by Tito Boeri (fRDB and Università Bocconi), Andrea Garnero (OECD) and Lorenzo Giovanni Luisetto (University of Trento). The research provides new evidence on the presence of no-compete clauses in the Italian labor market.
In the afternoon the report coordinated by Andrea Bassanini (OECD) on “Labour Market Concentration, Wages and Job Security in Europe” is presented and focuses on concentration of hiring in OECD labour markets.
The conference ends with a round table to which the Italian Minister of Labour and Social Policies, Andrea Orlando, Gianna Fracassi (Deputy Segretary General CGIL), Ana Sofia Rodrigues (Chief economist at Portuguese Competion Authority) and Antonio Spilimbergo (IMF) will participate.
- Opening Lecture Manning
- Presentation Garnero et al.
- Summary Boeri-Garnero-Luisetto (English)
- Summary Boeri-Garnero-Luisetto (Italian)
- Report Boeri-Garnero-Luisetto
- Discussion Starr
- Presentation Bassanini et al
- Summary Bassanini et al. (English)
- Summary Bassanini et al. (Italian)
- Report Bassanini et al.
- Discussion Marinescu
- Press Release